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edward
Posted - 2005/2/9 下午 02:17:17
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引述奧兄的說話:
Indeed God predestined no one to sin (& the punishment of Hell), since he never commands what is impossible. But before the foreseeing by God of any demerits (even for the sin of final impenitence leading to a man's damnation), there is already negative reprobation-the divine permission of these demerits. Without this permission these demerits would not happen in time and from all eternity could not be foreseen.
In my opinion, it is incorrect to say the damnation of a certain man due to foreseen demerits.
God simply knows ("預見") the final impenitence and damnation of some and He, out of His good pleasure, permits this to happen......
Is this your sense of "預見"? This is my sense of the word.
Something are in fact「預定」:the non-election and therefore the negative reprobation of some. These are predetermined from eternity. So these people are predetermined though not really positively reprobated nor necessitated (vs Protestantism) to Hell.
Non-election and positive reprobation (on account of final impenitence) are different. We cannot blame God for injustice when He elects one and not the other, just as we cannot blame Him for lack of mercy when he punishes the positive reprobate.
The non-election to heaven is predetermined 「預定」. But the Thomists are divided on the implication of this non-election. Some Thomists, such as those from Salamanca, holds that this predetermined non-election to Heaven really consists in the positive exclusion from glory. But all Thomists are unanimously against the theory of scientia media.
根據奧兄的看法,
一、天主對某些人的「不預選」(non-election),造成了罪人的最終不悔改,從而招來了天主對他們的擯棄,和最終的永罰。
二、天主對「將受永罰者」的行為容許,這種情況,是一種「消極擯棄」(negative reprobation)的行為。
三、這份「容許」,在因果關係裡,先於個別將受永罰者濫用自由所作的劣行(demerit)
四、但事實上,該些劣行卻實現了。
在這情況下,人還是不是自由的?天主「容許」人犯罪,是否人就必然地及不可避免地將會犯罪?
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edward
Posted - 2005/2/9 下午 04:19:10
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The Molinist Controversy
Catholic Predestination
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Augustine
Posted - 2005/2/9 下午 11:13:47
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For simplicity's sake, let us concentrate on non-election rather than election to heaven by God.
Also, since damnation is determinately caused by the sin of final impenitence, "所作的劣行 demerit" will be restricted, in this discussion, to the sin of final impenitence.
Further, negative reprobation---permission to sin (esp. final impenitence) of the non-elected should not be confused with the divine permission to the elects to sin during their lives, who after repentance, obtains a greater good. Whenever the word "negative reprobation" is used it is taken in the former sense.
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Augustine
Posted - 2005/2/9 下午 11:27:18
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(1) "天主「容許」人犯罪,是否人就必然地及不可避免地將會犯罪?"
(We are not interested in the previous sin, e.g. of St.Peter or St.Augustine who are permitted to sin before they die in grace. When we say 天主「容許」人犯罪, we specifically mean His permission for final impenitence, and hence the sin commited by the negative reprobates.)
(1) God first, in the order of casuality, from all eternity, elects certain men to glory. Those not chosen are termed "non-elected".
(2) For these non-elected, God must have permitted their sin (of final impenitence); otherwise without God's permission to sin they could not sin, and it is
against God's Justice to punish those who have not sinned (even they are presumed by us as non-elects).
This divine permission to sin is called negative reprobation.
(3) For a non-elect, that is one who is negatively reprobated; Could it be the case that he avoids sinning and therefore obtains by his own efforts glory?
This is impossible since if so then there is the goodness of final glory obtained without God's prior election, and without his special love. This amounts to the error of semi-Pelagianism.
This is against the principle of predilection:"Since God is the cause of any goodness in things; nothing would be better if not loved more by God". This is refered by St. Thomas, "since predestination (to glory) presupposes election, and election presupposes love in the order of reason (S.T. Ia q23, a3); nothing is better unless willed to be better or loved more by God".
(3) So he could not avoid sinning, the Council of Trent taught that original sin did not impair intrinsically freedom, so he sins afterwards freely.
The question is: Is he really freely when he couldn't avoid sinning? Put in Edward's words, is it "necessary" that he sins afterwards?
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Augustine
Posted - 2005/2/9 下午 11:59:30
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Of course the above passage is not our focus. Our primary question is: "How is liberty of the reprobated person be safeguarded, if he "necessarily", infallibly commit that sin of final impenitence?
I think the key lies in:
(1) Distingushing the "necessity of consequence" from the "necessity of consequent".
(2) Clarifying the meaning of liberty for infallible or pre-ordained acts.
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Augustine
Posted - 2005/2/10 下午 08:59:44
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The word "necessary" has two senses:
Consider the example given by St. Thomas in explaining how predetermination of voluntary acts reconciles with human liberty:
John is now sitting freely. He could stand up at any moment. Is the following true: " John who is sitting right now necessarily sits instead of stands"?
YES, since he is already sitting and no one sits and stands at the same time, he "necessarily" sits like that. (necessity of the consequence: the proposition taken in sensu compositu: John who is sitting right now, necessarily sitting instead of standing.)
NO, since he is free to stand up at any time. By his free will he is not "necessarily" sitting like that. (necessity of the consequent: the proposition taken in sensu diviso: John, who is sitting right now, necessarily sitting instead of standing.)
So it his sitting necessary or not?
Yes, in sense compositu, by necessity of consequence.
No, in sensu divisu, by necessity of the consequent.
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Augustine
Posted - 2005/2/10 下午 09:14:26
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Judas (for example) is not elected by God and is therefore permitted to sin, by definition he will infallibly sin (not just because he's being permmited to sin, many saints are permitted to sin too; but the definite cause is that he is not elected) and die out of grace otherwise God cannot without injustice positively reprobates him.
Is the following true: "Necessarily, Judas (a non-elect) who is foreseen by God to die in sin commit that sin of final impenitence"?
YES in sensu compositu: "Necessarily, Judas who is foreseen by God to die in sin, commit that sin of final impenitence." is true (of conditional necessity of consequence). What is impossible is the composite relation, taken as a whole, between God's foreknowledge or predetermination, and Judas' actual act, to be different.
NO in sensu diviso: "Necessarily, Judas, who is foreseen by God to die in sin, commit that sin of final impenitence." is false (of non-conditional necessity of the consequent).
What is impossible is ONLY the composite realities of God's foreknowledge and Judas's act, taken as a whole, to differ. To wit, even if Judas has acted otherwise, it is still possible to preserve the truth in sensu compositu: God's foreknowledge agrees with Judas' actual act, how? if Judas refrains from that sin, God's foreknowledge would have been diffenet, how is this conceivable? because Judas's act and God's foresee are taken in sensu diviso.
Judas still has the possiblility to refrain from sin, though in reality he will not.
The difficulty lies mainly in the properties of entites like "freedom", "possibility". Such things are not knowable in themselves, i.e. they are in potentiality as regards their objects, the actions. Just as Potency is unknowable and obscure apart from the corresponding Act, it is impossible by reason alone to arrive at "freedom" without the act of the objects.
That is, no one knows by reason alone whether Judas has the ability to escape sin unless he really does do. But the reality is, he never does so. Does that mean he has no power to do so? By no means.
Conclusion:
Since Judas does not sin out of necessity of the consequent (considered in the context of divine foreknowledge, and reprobation), we cannot say he sins out of absolute necessity (the act considered in itself and not compositely with divine foreknowledge) which kills Freedom.
Hence we cannot say Judas sins without freedom.
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edward
Posted - 2005/2/11 下午 07:39:03
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以故的Fr. William G Most曾評論過十六世紀末、多瑪斯與摩連那學派之間的爭論:
In 1597 Pope Clement VIII ordered both the above schools to send delegates to Rome to debate before a commission of Cardinals. The debates ran about 10 years. After a time the Pope himself presided. Clement VIII died, and Paul V inherited the debates. Paul V asked St. Francis de Sales, a saint and a great theologian, for advice. Francis advised him to approve neither school. He did that in 1607. Divine Providence was protecting the Church from two great errors.
Predestination
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獨立思考
Posted - 2005/2/12 上午 01:34:28
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我對這個題目很有興趣, 請問有沒有中文?
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simon
Posted - 2005/2/19 下午 10:18:35
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獨思兄:
有中文版的,如果你願意聘請一個中文打字老師,教Augustine中文輸入法。
老實說,我中學會考英文科是 A 的,但要用英文來了解神學觀點,是很吃力。
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edward
Posted - 2005/2/27 下午 08:16:54
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覆獨思兄:
轉載自溫保祿神父所著的:《天主恩寵的福音》(光啟,1992)
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有關恩寵的爭論
一、有關奧斯定學派的爭論
彌蓋.巴依烏斯(Michael Baius, 1513-1589)、楊森(Jansenius, 1585-1638)、巴夏斯.格斯奈(Paschasius Quesnel, 1634-1719)三人有關恩寵的思想在神學上被稱為「已不通用的奧斯定學說」(Archaic Augustinianism)或「非正統的奧斯定學說」(Heterodox Augustinianism)或「新奧斯定學說」(Neo-Augustinianism)。他們如此被稱,是因為他們採用了奧斯定的恩寵概念,卻沒有注意到這概念在歷史中的演變及其不同的意義。這些人都是忠於教會的熱心信友,他們尋找一個生活的神學,回溯到教父的思想,尤其希望恢復奧斯定的傳統。他們反對當時的人文主義,又不滿此時的士林神學。為了抵抗人文主義對基督信仰的影響,他們便重新強調人由於罪的腐敗和對恩寵的絕對需要。他們有關恩寵的主張可簡述如下:
在某一角度下,天主必須給亞當恩寵,這樣,才合創造主的正義。這好像是說,恩寵是人性的一部分,而不是白給的恩賜,天主有責任創造一個有恩寵的人,不然,人不會有幸福。
原罪使人完全失落他的自由。因此,人注定要在貪慾的控制之下,而貪慾本身就是罪,所以人必然的犯罪。救贖和成義並非恢復人的自由,而是一個新的意志方向,但這新的方向並非人的自由意志所認可的,不是人以自由所接受的;也就是說,人不能拒絕天主的恩寵。明顯地,這種主張必要達到的結論是:天主的普救意願和基督死亡的救恩意義是有限的。
教會訓導對上述這種爭論的主張,予以拒絕。先是教宗比約五世(Pius V)在一五六七年棄絕了巴依烏斯的一些主張(DS 1901-1980)。接著,教宗依諾森十世(Innocent X)在一六五三年也揚棄了楊森的一些思想(DS 2001-2005)。最後,在一七一三年教宗克來孟十一世(Clement XI)擯棄了格斯奈的一些看法(DS 2401-2440)。藉著上述的措施,教會訓導當局重新肯定恩寵的無功行賞性質(DS 1921-1955-1978),也再一次肯定了人在恩寵推動下的自由(DS 2002)和基督死亡的普世得救意義(DS 2005)。
二、多瑪斯派與摩里納派之間的爭論
在重視自由的人文主義的影響下,神學不得不對恩寵與自由之間的關係加以反省。當代的神學把現恩分成兩種:「足夠恩寵」(gratia sufficiens)和「有效恩寵」(gratia efficax)。足夠恩寵「給予靈魂以完成得救善工的能力」;有效恩寵「實際促成得救善工的踐行」。在探討恩寵與自由的關係時,當時的神學就問:上述恩寵的區分,「究竟是由於內在的差異?抑或因自由意志的接納,使它有了外在的不同?」。
在十六、十七世紀,兩神學學派、即多瑪斯學派和摩里納派對這問題各持己見而引發激烈的爭論。今把他們的主張分述如下:
(1)多瑪斯派的主張
所謂多瑪斯派的主要創立人是道明會神學家道明.巴聶池(Domingo Banez, 1528-1604)。這學派強調天主是絕對的主,祂有絕對無上的主權,祂的一切行為必然會達到目的。在這理論中,上述兩種恩寵的分別不可能來自人,而應來自天主。換言之,按此看法,在有效恩寵和足夠恩寵之間確有一個內在與本質上的差別。藉著有效恩寵,天主在人的自由意志上,有實質的作為,催促人自由地決定與恩寵合作,有效恩寵憑其內在能力,百發百中地使意志作自由的接納;而足夠恩寵則僅僅給予為得救而行善的能力,要使這潛質能實現還需要一種新的具有內在差別的恩寵,就是有效恩寵。
明顯地,這理論的難題是:僅僅足夠恩寵是否真正的足夠?人的自由意志如何與有效恩寵相協調?又假定天主的有效恩寵是無法抗拒的,那麼,當人不能達成目的時,是否只因天主沒有給他提供這恩寵呢?以這理論為基礎,人又怎能真心痛悔己罪呢?
(2)摩里納派的主張
此派的創始者為耶穌會會士路易.摩里納(Luis de Molina, 1535-1600)。按他的主張,在有效恩寵與足夠恩寵之間並沒有內在與本質的差別,而足有外在附屬的區分而已。天主以足夠恩寵鞏固人的意志力,使他能有超性的活動。這時如果人願意,他就能實行得救的善工。如果自由意志接納恩寵,並藉恩寵之助完成了得救的行為,則足夠恩寵本身成為有效恩寵,假如人用自由拒絕與恩寵合作,那麼,恩寵就僅僅足夠而已。
這個理論的難題是:既然天主的恩寵是可以落空的,那麼,天主是否仍然在各方面是絕對的主呢?祂是否仍舊是一切受造行動的第一因呢?換言之,那個把足夠恩寵轉化為有效恩寵的能力不是來自第一因──天主本身?此能力的泉源是在天主之外的一個存在物?再者在祈禱的時候,我們是否可以對天主說:「天主,我感謝祢,因為祢賞給我足夠的恩寵」;而同時又想「是我把這足夠恩寵轉變成有效恩寵」?
我們無法在此詳細敍述兩派之間的各種爭論(1582-1607),只扼要地指出以下幾個重點:
當時的教宗為了解決這種爭論,成立了一個委員會,專門研究所爭執的問題。該委員會的主要任務是,徹查摩里納派的見解能否與教會的傳統協調。此委員會經查究後,對多瑪斯派的看法予以贊成。至於摩里納派的主張兩次險遭擯棄。最後投票的結果是:四票支持多瑪斯派,二票支持摩里納派(其中一票是耶穌會士樞機聖勞伯.斐拉明〔St. Robert Bellarmine〕),三票要求繼續研究這個問題。
教宗保祿五世(Paul V)在一六零七年致函耶穌會和道明會的總會長,信中宣佈解散這研究委員會,要求兩派等待另一新決定,並禁止他們「指責對方……」。在此信函中,教宗也表示「切望大家自制,不要出言粗暴,而令人難堪」。同時他准許他們在各自的神學院教授自己的理論(DS 1997)。然而,一直到今天,訓導當局對此問題仍未作出任何新決定。
這種不決定的決定顯示,在這問題上我們面對一個絕大的奧跡。我們實在無法明瞭:絕對的天主與人的自由如何協調?「受造的自由」好像是一自相矛盾的概念。受造的人既完全在全能的天主手裡,人怎可能是自動自發的呢?怎麼能有真正的自由呢?上述的奧跡,只是在行動和自由的平面上,反映更基本的、更深的天主與世界共存的奧跡:意即在一位無限的天主「之外」,怎麼能存有與天主有分別的真實存在物呢?
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靚仔
Posted - 2005/2/27 下午 10:10:07
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西滿兄:
老實說我會考英文是D的,但很多時我令願看英文神學書籍,也較看中文翻譯好.
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simon
Posted - 2005/2/27 下午 11:43:26
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靚仔,
會考英文拿 A 的人,英文未必比拿 D 的好。成績可能只反映前者懂得考試技巧而已。
Edward,
天主給某人「足夠恩寵」,但那人死不悔改,天主又早就預料到。那麼,「足夠恩寵」是否足夠?
聖母領報,是「足夠恩寵」還是「有效恩寵」?若是前者,我佩服聖母,佩服她的勇氣和服從。若是後者(即聖母根本沒有能力去拒絕和天主合作),那麼我仍然尊敬她,因她是耶穌的媽媽,但不會佩服她,因沒有選擇權的人,和機械人差不多。
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edward
Posted - 2005/3/1 下午 06:45:19
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靚仔兄:
可能是由於學術化的中文,往往變得和洋文差不多,而失去了它應有的氣質。
有沒有辦法,可以讓一些神學詞語的中文字數減少?
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edward
Posted - 2005/3/1 下午 06:50:41
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西滿兄:
所有已成義及能堅守至終的人(包括聖母),都是領受了有效恩寵。但這份恩寵卻不否定人的自由。
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simon
Posted - 2005/3/2 下午 03:37:18
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edward,
人的自由意志,能否拒絕「有效恩寵」?
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edward
Posted - 2005/3/5 下午 08:08:32
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西滿兄:
人的意志,能夠拒絕足夠恩寵;但有效恩寵預設了人的自由合作,因此在事實上是不能被拒絕的。
足夠恩寵的「足夠」,是指天主給予人得救所需的各項因素。若該項潛能最終未有實現,則是出於人自己的過錯。
The Necessity Of Intrinsically Efficacious Actual Graces For The Performance Of Salutary Acts
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simon
Posted - 2005/3/5 下午 10:17:29
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edward,
你說:「人的意志,能夠拒絕足夠恩寵;但有效恩寵預設了人的自由合作,因此在事實上是不能被拒絕的。」
天主給瑪利亞的恩寵,叫「有效恩寵」,是因為天主早知她會合作。對嗎?
若天主把同樣程度的恩寵給另一個女子,比如陳小花,但陳小花並不如瑪利亞有信德,她以自由意志拒絕了天主。於是,那份恩寵,就不是「有效恩寵」了。
究竟你說的所謂「有效恩寵」,是因人而異,還是恆久不變的?若是因人而異,「有效恩寵」就等於「足夠恩寵」。若是恆久不變(即無論何人都必然有效),那麼,亞戊亞壽也可以當聖母了。因為天主把那份「有效恩寵」給任何人,那人必會「有效地」合作,我看不到這樣的亞戊亞壽聖母,有何過人之處。
請認真想清楚,到底恩寵是否真的可分為「足夠恩寵」和「有效恩寵」。
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edward
Posted - 2005/3/8 下午 07:12:09
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覆西滿兄:
兄所理解的恆久不變,用於天主所賦予的有效恩寵,是正確的。(假設性的、理論上的)若天主將所賦予給聖母相同份量的恩寵,分給其他人,則他們亦會成為聖母。但有如聖保祿宗徒所言:神恩各有不同、聖神按照自己的尺度給予恩賜。因此,除非救主需要多次降生受難,否則不可能有多過一位聖母。
按定義而言,有效恩寵預設了受惠者的自由合作。因此,若天主給陳小花有效恩寵,則她不可能拒絕。然而我們相信,即使在這種情況下,陳小花仍是完全自由的。至於天主如何能「有效地推動人的自由」,則是一個奧秘了。
「有效恩寵」與「足夠恩寵」的神學思考,是源於我們反省人最終得救和受罰的過程中,天主與人的角色孰何?
人的得救,是完全基於天主恩寵的推動,並有效地透過人的合作而得到實現。教會同時相信:(一)天主恩寵的優先性,(二)人的自由參與。因此我們認為:即使我們自由地決定與天主結合,這份決定亦是基於天主的推動。天主並不看人將來的功績而賜恩。
同時我們相信:在地獄受罰的人,他們受罰並不是因為天主沒有給了他們足夠的恩寵,而是由於他們自己的拒絕。但為何祂會容許「罪」的出現,這亦是一個奧秘。
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simon
Posted - 2005/3/8 下午 10:09:30
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edward,
你說:「有效恩寵預設了受惠者的自由合作。」」
你是否認為是「預設」,而不是「預知」?
若是「預設」,何來「自由決定」?
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edward
Posted - 2005/3/11 下午 07:19:10
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為天主而言,預設和預知,是同一回事。祂無限的認知和意願,是一致的。
但我們的信仰肯定:縱然這是天主的安排,但亦不與人的自由抵觸。在成義和得救的過程中,天主是首要原因而人是次要原因。救恩完全出於天主、亦完全是出於人;但在墮落的過程裡,人卻完全是第一因。
是以神學有謂:「人是惡行的第一因」(homo prima causa mali),而聖多瑪斯亦引述歐瑟亞先知所云:「O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thine help」(歐十三9)。
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simon
Posted - 2005/3/12 上午 12:58:44
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edward,
你又打茅波了。
你說:「但我們的信仰肯定:縱然這是天主的安排,但亦不與人的自由抵觸。」
對於「有效恩寵」,既是天主的安排,何來人的自由選擇?
是天主安排百分之九十九,人負責百分一?還是天主安排百分百,人根本無力反對?
「預設」和「預知」,是很不同的。比如人犯罪,天主是預知,而不是預設。
請舉實例說明你不是打茅波。
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edward
Posted - 2005/3/13 下午 01:56:43
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若我們將人得救的經歷,說成是「天主與人各出其力」,例如:天主出百分之九十九而人出其餘百分之一,則會相似白拉奇的異端。白拉奇的說法為:天主向我招手,而我走向祂。
教會的訓導是:天主不僅向我招手,祂亦使我走向祂;該百分之一的力的運用,亦是天主給我的恩賜──祂促使我可以自由地對祂作出積極的回應。
人的自由,如何能在被天主「推動」的情況下,仍然真實地得到保存和實現?這是一個奧秘。我們相信,但未能完全明白。
我們的進路不該是「天主與人、恩寵與自由」,而應為「天主藉著人、恩寵透過自由」(God through man, grace through will)。
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simon
Posted - 2005/3/13 下午 08:55:14
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edward,
你說:「但我們的信仰肯定:縱然這是天主的安排,但亦不與人的自由抵觸。」
二百年前流行盲婚,有個傻瓜說:「縱然我的老婆是我母親的安排,但亦不與我的自由抵觸。」
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simon
Posted - 2005/3/13 下午 09:06:49
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edward,
說法一:「天主向我招手,而我走向祂。」是異端。
說法二:「天主向一百人招手,使人們走向祂。但結果有人走向祂,有人不走;前者上天國,後者下地獄。」這是edward和教會的想法。
我就看不出說法一和說法二有甚麼分別。
究竟一個人走向天主,是天主作出offer然後人自由決定,還是天主百分百的操控呢?
如果一個人走向天主,是天主百分百的操控,那麼,為甚麼會有人不走向天主呢?對於不走向天主的人,為甚麼天主不需要負責呢?
如果一個人走不走向天主,並非天主百分百的操控,那麼,說法一「天主向我招手,而我走向祂。」就不是異端,而是事實。
edward,如果你連這個問題都搞不清楚,卻可認定在生時沒有走向天主的人,全是人的過錯,並必下地獄,我只可說,你的信德,是我望塵莫及。
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